Today, we had a supermarket fire in the United States in 2001. Firefighters were trapped. The fast search and rescue team searched and rescued firefighters to discuss the corresponding team.

The fast search and rescue team is the foreign team responsible for the search and rescue work of lost firefighters.

Case review

2001.3.14, a supermarket in Phoenix, United States, had a five-level fire alarm. More than 100 firefighters went to the scene to rescue. Unfortunately, one firefighter was killed and another four were injured (one of them was even on the scene. Did not breathe heartbeat, then came back to the first aid).

After a thorough investigation, NIOSH published a complete report on 2002.07.25, detailedly investigated the entire process, analyzed the underlying causes, and gave clear recommendations to the fire department and equipment manufacturers.

During the incident, probably the most important part, briefly share with you:

Two groups of people laid two hoses and attacked one. One of the hoses was in charge of Engine14. The other was responsible for other hoses. After they had laid down the internal attack and completed the initial search.

In addition to the E14 members, the other group reported to the IC "Incident commander on-site commander" that the internal situation is getting worse.

The IC decided to turn the original attack tactics into defense, so we called everyone to retreat.

E14 members were enumerators: commanders, pilots, firefighters, Victim (missing firefighters). At the time of the decision to withdraw, the driver was then the first, Victim and firefighters, and finally the commander.

During the withdrawal process, Victim and the firefighters were stricken with things as they passed through the product storage area in the supermarket. As a result, both of them lost their way and could not find any water.

At this time, the commanders behind both of them were in the same condition, but at that time another commander of the Hose Group Engine3 found him, took him, and guided him out of the direction, so he went smoothly to the exit. Now.

Victim and the firefighter got up after falling and walked through a door (wall) and fell again. They found themselves lost and called Mayday's "help signal."

Immediately upon receipt, IC dispatched Engine18 and Ladder9 as RIC to rescue them.

The rescue process was too lengthy, so I did not elaborate on it.

Victim shouted MAYDAY at 17:26.

IC sent RIC at 17:27.

Firefighters positioned Victim at 17:36,

Finally, Victim was rescued at 18:19.

During the entire rescue process, a total of 12 "Mayday" distress signals were issued. The 12 "Mayday" signals caused a tragedy of 1 death and 4 injuries.

Research and exploration

After the fire, the Fire Department immediately examined the concept of rapid search and rescue and the “Mayday” program. They asked their own questions: Fast search and rescue is not fast at all.

Therefore, the article "Rapid intervention isn't rapid" was published in 2003.12.1.

The important content of this article is as follows:

In the second year after the fire broke out, the Fire Bureau found a similar place for similar cases and conducted actual combat simulation exercises and training.

Among them, 269 fire engines, ladder trucks and salvage vehicles and 1,144 fire fighters participated in the drill and training. The main contents of the training were internal firemen trapped and RIC entered emergency rescue operations.

Inside the building, in the case of personnel trapped, a group of 4 firemen laid about 45 meters of water into the building. When the withdrawal instruction was issued, the commander and driver safely withdrew from the building, and two other firemen were Internally lose contact with each other.

Firefighter 1: Removable, but the gas cylinder is almost empty. There is a radio station next to the water and radio stations can be used.

Firefighter 2: Leaving the end of the hose about 12 meters, the radio cannot be used to fall to the ground, and the call for help has started.

The firefighter 1 will use the radio to report to the IC that he had dissipated with his companions, and the air volume was no more.

RIC entered the rescue basic situation (in two parts):

first part:

Position the firefighter 1. Evaluate his gas volume, assist in filling gas cylinders (UAC), or use the shared system to call him to the rescue interface (the Phoenix Fire Department identified the use of the shared system as a MAYDAY event) to rescue the firefighters.

 

the second part:

Positioning firefighters 2, rescue personnel should monitor their own air volume, internal fire conditions and safety assessments, assess the status of firefighters 2 (air content), fill the cylinders of firefighters 2, and rescue firefighters 2.

The above content is the exploration and research that they have made after questioning.

in conclusion

In simulation exercises and training, more than 200 similar scenarios were simulated and the following important data were obtained (this data is based on the average data of more than 200 drills):

1

RIC needs 2.47 minutes to complete the on-site standby.

2

After receiving the "MAYDAY" signal, RIC needs 2.55 minutes to attack the rescue.

3

RIC takes 5.33 minutes to locate the firefighter 2.

4

The RIC takes 21.8 minutes to locate, dispose of, and rescue firefighters 1 and firefighters 2 . Defense

There is no pyrotechnic in the situation setting of this exercise, so in the actual fire scene, the above time data needs to be further evaluated (only extended).

 

When receiving the “MAYDAY” signal, it needs at least 2.55+5.33=7.88 to locate trapped firefighters for about 8 minutes! (The above data is calculated in the scenario of this exercise. Of course, different environments will have different data.)

Old Beauty thinks that the above time is slow. Regardless of time, Orange Sir thinks this is not important.

We should see this behind the firefighter's sacrifice case and should learn the following:

It is the driving force for the continuous advancement of the firefighting cause that the small, big, questioned and explored research spirit.

In this article, paragraphs are very good

Many times we use a residential mentality in connection with commercial structures. In most fire departments, 95 percent of structural fires are in residences. In most residences, if you wait until your low-air alarm activates to exit the structure, you can almost always Get out without many problems.

But, taking that mentality into a commercial structure may prove fatal. Commercial fires are different animals; we must train for commercial fires and carry those habits into residences. Don't wait for your low-air alarm to activate before leaving residential or commercial buildings .

The general idea is as follows:

1. The habit of air-expiratory volume management should be developed from a small fire field. Fires in large-scale spaces such as commercial buildings should be used as drills to further develop good air management practices and then bring such habits to general building fire applications.

2. I don’t know how long it will last. As long as I’m free, I’ll go online and look for some American materials to see. Even if it’s age-old data, it will find that a small part of it is precious.

In this case, the various reports of the United States from 2001 to 2003 gave me a lot of information that I think is important.

This article is reproduced from WeChat public number: Orange Rescue.